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ADOPTING THE IMPLIED WARRANTY OF
HABITABILITY TO DEFINE SUBSTANTIAL
PERFORMANCE IN THE SALE OF NEW
HOMES
In the last three decades, more than twenty jurisdictions have es-
tablished some form of implied warranty of habitability on new
houses purchased from builder-vendors.' This warranty affords
house buyers remedies for latent defects in the construction of their
new homes.2 The definition and application of this implied warranty
varies widely from state to state. In Petersen v. Hubschman Construc-
tion Co., 3 the Illinois Supreme Court definitively established that
1. See, e.g., Vanderschrier v. Aaron, 103 Ohio App. 340, 140 N.E.2d 819 (1957).
Vanderschrier is the landmark American case in house warranty law. The Ohio court
recognized an implied warranty for latent defects causing basement flooding when the
buyer purchased the house before completion of construction.
Since Vanderschrier, the following jurisdictions have recognized an implied war-
ranty by either judicial caveat or legislation. By case law: Cochran v. Keeton, 287
Ala. 439, 242 So. 2d 313 (1971); Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922
(1970); Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 344, 525 P.2d 88, 155 Cal. Rptr.
648 (1974); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964); Brennan v.
Watergate West, 391 A.2d 1351 (D.C. 1978); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415
P.2d 698 (1966); Barnes v. Mac Brown and Co., 264 Ind. 141, 342 N.E.2d 611 (1976);
Crawley v. Turhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1969); Weeks v. Slavick Builders, Inc., 24
Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503 (1970); O'Dell v. Custom Builders, Inc., 560 S.W.2d
862 (Mo. 1978); Henggeler v. Jindra, 191 Neb. 317, 214 N.W.2d 925 (1974); Norton v.
Burleaud, 115 N.H. 435, 342 A.2d 629 (1975); Dobler v. Malloy, 214 N.W.2d 510
(N.D. 1973); Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974); Jones v. Gate-
wood, 381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963); Yepsen v. Burgess, 269 Or. 520, 525 P.2d 1019
(1974); Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972); Padula v. J. J. Deb-Cin
Homes, Inc., 111 R.I. 29, 298 A.2d 529 (1973); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407,
175 S.E.2d 792 (1970); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 83 S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d
803 (1967); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968); Bolkum v. Staab, 133 Vt.
467, 346 A.2d 210 (1975); House v. Thornton, 76 Wash. 2d 428, 457 P.2d 199 (1969);
Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975). By statute: CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 47-116 to 120 (1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.203 (West Supp. 1981) (condomini-
ums only); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 10-203 (Michie Supp. 1980); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 46:3B-1 to 12 (West 1980).
2. See notes 19 & 26 and accompanying text infra.
3. 76 Ill. 2d 31, 389 N.E.2d 1154 (1979).
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such an implied warranty exists and by analogy adopted the warranty
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code4 (UCC) to define the
rights of builders and buyers under this warranty. The court not only
ratified the implied warranty as an independent cause of action but
also held the warranty to be an element of substantial performance.'
Plaintiffs in Petersen contracted with a commercial builder-
vendor6 for the purchase of a residential lot and construction of a
house thereon.7 The purchasers objected to the defendant builder's
continued inadequate construction' and refused to close the transac-
tion.9 In response, the defendant invoked a contract forfeiture clause
and retained the Petersens' down payment.10 The builder-vendor ar-
gued that he had substantially performed the contract because the
house was habitable under the Illinois definition of implied warranty
of habitability." Although agreeing that the warranty was an ele-
4. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 26 (Smith-Hurd 1977) [hereinafter cited as UCC] (Illinois
adopted the Uniform Commercial Code in 1961).
5. When the Petersens repudiated the contract, it was executory; substantial per-
formance by the builder-vendor, including the implied warranty, was a constructive
condition to performance by plaintiffs. 76 Ill. 2d at 43-44, 389 N.E.2d at 1159.
6. Id. at 40, 389 N.E.2d at 1158. The court labeled builder-vendor as a person
"who is in the business of building and selling houses." Id. This definition is com-
mon. Frequently, however, implied warranty cases arise where the builder is also the
developer, selling both the house and the land. See, e.g., Hoye v. Century Builders,
52 Wash. 2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958). See general o , Annot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383 (1969).
7. 76 IM. 2d at 35, 389 N.E.2d at 1155.
8. The plaintiffs complained of various flaws in defendant's construction as fol-
lows: a basement floor improperly pitched away from the drains; a defective window;
defective installation of, and materials for the front doorway; drywall cracks; and nail
popping. Defendant agreed to repair the listed items, but failed to do so. To promote
performance, plaintiff requested $1,000 be held in escrow until proper completion of
the home. Defendant rejected this idea. Id. at 36, 389 N.E.2d at 1156.
9. The term "closing" connotes both the final payment for the land and house and
the transfer of ownership. Generally, a closing is a meeting between the parties ar-
ranged to adjust final sales figures, taxes, and other incidentals. See A. AXELROD, C.
BERGER, AND Q. JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER AND FINANCE 1122 (3rd ed. 1978).
10. 76 IM. 2d at 36,389 N.E.2d at 1156. Defendant also refused to compensate the
vendees for the labor and materials they supplied for the house pursuant to an agree-
ment whereby Mr. Petersen, a plumber, would do the plumbing and heating work on
the house. In return, he would receive an abatement on the purchase price. Mr. Pc-
tersen provided labor and materials valued at $9,000 by the trial court. Id., 389
N.E.2d at 1155.
11. The trial court rejected the defendant's argument and found for the plaintiffs,
holding that the Petersens' repudiation was justifiable. The court ordered the defend-
ant to return the $10,000 earnest money and pay the fair value of the labor and mater-
ials that plaintiffs expended on the house. The defendant asserted, as his defense, that
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IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
ment of substantial performance, the Illinois Supreme Court differed
with the builder's definition. 2 Applying the UCC by analogy, the
court held that substantial performance of a building contract re-
quires compliance with the implied warranty of habitability. 3
The application of an implied warranty to new house sales is a
recent legal development altering the established doctrines of caveat
emptor and merger, which formerly governed builder liability in the
sale of real property. Caveat emptor'4 is a judicially-created doctrine
premised on the buyer's presumed inspection of property and arm's-
length negotiations with the seller. 5 Under this theory, once the
the house was habitable, irrespective of defects, and thus he substantially performed.
This defense is unusual as it is commonly the purchaser, not the builder, who relies on
the implied warranty. The appellate court, however, rejected the defense. 53 Inl. App.
3d 626, 368 N.E.2d 1044 (1977).
12. 76 III. 2d at 41, 389 N.E.2d at 1158. The defendant relied upon Goggin v. Fox
Valley Constr. Corp., 48 Ill. App. 3d 103, 365 N.E.2d 509 (1977), which stated:
The primary function of a new home is to shelter its inhabitants from the ele-
ments. If a new home does not keep out the elements because of a substantial
defect of construction, such a home is not habitable within the meaning of the
implied warranty of habitability. . . . Another function of a new home is to
provide its inhabitants with a reasonably safe place to live. . . . If the home is
not structurally sound. . . [,] such a home is not habitable.
Id. at 106, 365 N.E.2d at 511.
The Petersen court rejected this reasoning and noted "[t]he use of the term habita-
bility is perhaps unfortunate. Because of its imprecise meaning it is susceptible of
[sic] misconstruction." 76 Ill. 2d at 41, 389 N.E.2d at 1158.
13. 76 I. 2d at 42, 389 N.E.2d at 1159.
14 Loosely translated this means "let the buyer beware." BLACK'S LAW DIc-
TIONARY 202 (5th ed. 1965).
15. See Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133 (1931).
This article provides the classic discussion of the origin and development of the caveat
emptor doctrine. The following articles provide a comprehensive background in the
doctrine of caveat emptor as it applies to real property. They postulate that continued
reliance on caveat emptor is inequitable under modern marketing practices, and artic-
ulate theories presently applied by some courts. Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of
Realty-Recent Assaults upon the Rule, 14 VAND. L. REV. 541 (1961); Dunham, Ven-
dor's Obligation as to Fitness of Landfor a Particular Purpose, 37 MINN. L. REV. 108
(1953); Haskell, The Casefor Implied Warranty of Quality in Sales ofRealProperty, 53
GEo. L.J. 633 (1965); Jaeger, The Warranty of Habitability (pt. I.), 47 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 1 (1970); Roberts, The Case of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant
Didlt, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 835 (1967).
More recent sources describe the erosion of caveat emptor, noting the specific ten-
dencies of courts as they apply the implied warranty of habitability to new houses.
See Bixby, Let the Seller Beware" Remediesfor the Purchaser ofa Defective Home, 49
J. URB. L. 533 (1971); Jaeger, Apartments and Houses: The Warranty of Habitability,
12 AKRON L. REv. 373 (1979); Jaeger, An Emerging Concept: Consumer Protection
in Statutory Regulation, Products Liability and the Sale of New Homes, 11 VAL. L.
19801
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
buyer has had an opportunity to examine the house and has
purchased it, he can no longer hold the seller liable for defects.' 6
According to the doctrine of merger, when the purchaser accepts a
deed, the contract, including all its obligations, merges into it. Thus,
if problems with the house appear after delivery of the deed, its pro-
visions, rather than those of the contract, govern the builder-vendor's
liability.'" Since deeds usually do not contain specific contractual
covenants regarding house warranties,' merger, like caveat emptor,
in effect leaves the purchaser without remedy for defects discovered
after the sale. Currently, courts are invalidating both doctrines using
various legal theories, the most important being the implied warranty
of habitability.' 9
REV. 335 (1977); Maldonado, Builder Beware. Strict Tort Liabilityfor Mass-Produced
Housing, 7 REAL EST. L.J. 283 (1979); Roeser, The Implied Warranty ofHabitability in
the Sale of New Housing: The Trend in Illinois, 1978 S. ILL. U. L.J. 178; Schwartz,
De/ective Housing, The Fall of Caveat Emptor, 33 J. AM. LAW. A. 122 (1970); Note,
Products Liability: Implied Warranty in the Sale of New Homes, 38 Mo. L. REV. 315
(1973); Note, Elderkin v. Gaster-he Pennsylvania Experience with Implied Warran-
ties in Sales of New Homes, 47 TEMP. L.Q. 172 (1973); Note, Developments in Actions
for Breach of Implied Warranties of Habitability in the Sale of New Houses, 10 TULSA
L.J. 445 (1975); Note, Implied Warranties on New House Construction: Caveat Ohio
Purchasers, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 207 (1977); Note, Expansion of Consumer Protection in
the Purchase of New Homes, 3 WEST. ST. U. L. REV. 106 (1975); Comment, Home
Sales-A Crack in the Caveat Emptor Shield, 29 MERCER L. REV. 493 (1978); Com-
ment, Extension of Implied Warranties to Developer- Vendors of Completed New
Homes, I1 URBAN L. ANN. 257 (1976).
16. E.g., Druid Homes, Inc. v. Cooper, 272 Ala. 415, 131 So. 2d 884 (1961); Levy
v. C. Young Constr. Co., 46 N.J. Super. 293, 134 A.2d 717 (App. Div. 1957), a 'don
other grounds, 26 N.J. 330, 139 A.2d 738 (1958). See also note 19 supra.
17. See, e.g., Weber v. Aluminum Ore Co., 304 Ill. 273, 136 N.E. 685 (1922)
(plaintiff's acceptance of the deed merged all prior conversations and agreements in
reference to the subject property). Contra, Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387
-P.2d 260 (1963) (since the home was incomplete at the date of closing, no merger
occurred, and unperformed agreements remained obligatory; the warranty of habita-
bility remained an obligation on the builder).
18. See generally Roeser, supra note 15.
19. Formerly, the common law grounds for suits against builders-vendors by pur-
chasers were: fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, lack of substantial performance, and
breach of express warranty. These theories focused on the builder's behavior, so that
courts imposed liability only when the purchaser proved defendant's bad faith or
breach of contract.
Until the advent of the implied warranty of habitability, buyers also resorted to
negligence claims. As Dean Prosser noted, house buyers were often frustrated since
negligence was difficult to prove. In addition, other problems with the negligence
theory developed because defects frequently resulted without fault. To resolve these
problems, courts have looked to products liability cases and the theories of strict lia-
[Vol. 20:247
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IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
By 1937, two English cases had established that builder-vendors
impliedly warrant a house sold during the course of construction.2"
This warranty provided for completion of the house in a workman-
like manner. Initially, courts implied this warranty only to unfin-
ished houses because of the buyer's forced reliance on the builder's
skill and expertise.2 ' According to the two English courts, the pur-
chaser of a completed home was better able to inspect the house
before purchasing, and thus did not require similar protection.
22
Some courts noted the unfairness of according an implied warranty
of habitability to purchasers of houses under construction while de-
nying purchasers of completed new homes a similar remedy.23 In
Carpenter v. Donohoe,24 the Colorado Supreme Court found this dis-
tinction artificial.25 The court therefore eliminated the discrepancy
in remedies by permitting purchasers of completed new houses to re-
cover for latent defects on the implied warranty theory.
bility and implied warranty. See PROSSER, TORTS § 97 (4th ed. 1971). See also
McNamara, The Implied Warranty in New-House Construction: Has the Doctrine of
Caveat Emptor Been Abolished?, I REAL EST. L.J. 43 (1972).
20. Miller v. Cannon Hill Est., Ltd., [1931] 2 K.B. 113. In Miller, the plaintiff
purchased a home during the course of its construction. After taking possession, the
purchaser abandoned the house when latent defects caused excessive dampness, ren-
dering it uninhabitable. Although the court predicated plaintiff's recovery on an ex-
press warranty, dicta suggested that in a house purchased during construction, there is
an implied warranty that it will be completed in a workmanlike manner.
In Perry v. Sharon Dev. Co., [1937] 4 All E.R. 390 (C.A.), the court expressly ap-
plied the Miller dicta where the buyer purchased the home during the process of
construction. The court held the builder liable for the breach of implied warranty.
21. Courts presumed that buyers purchasing incomplete homes were unable to
inspect them, and thus were at the mercy of builders. Hence, courts formulated an
implied warranty that a builder would perform as promised and in a workmanlike
manner. The same courts, on the other hand, found that in purchases of completed
homes, the buyer, who had not relied on the builder, could inspect the new home to
discover the defects. See Jones v. Gatewood, 381 P.2d 158 (Okla. 1963). See also
note 15 supra.
22. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
23. See generaly Haskell, supra hote 15. Noting the improbability of a house
purchaser negotiating and obtaining express warranties, Haskell argues that this legal
fiction operates as a hardship on buyers. Id. at 633.
24. 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964).
25. Id. at 83, 388 P.2d at 402.
That a different rule should apply to the purchaser of a house which is near
completion than would apply to one who purchases a new house seems incongru-
ous. To say that the former may rely on an implied warranty and the latter
cannot is recognizing a distinction without a reasonable basis for it.
Id.
1980]
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With the emergence of the implied warranty of habitability26 for
new houses, courts have departed from the traditional body of'con-
tract law for builders,27 applying instead the law of sales.2" Some of
26. As the law of implied warranty developed, constants appeared. First, courts
found a notice requirement under the implied warranty of habitability which pro-
vided the builder-vendor with an opportunity to repair defects. E.g., Matulunas v.
Baker, 569 S.W.2d 791 (Mo. App. 1978) (recovery possible after the builder-vendor
had an opportunity to observe the defect and failed to correct it). Accord, Wawak v.
Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449 S.W.2d 922 (1970) (buyer recovered for defective installa-
tion of air conditioning and heating elements; buyer's notification to builder with op-
portunity to repair sufficiently mitigated damages). Cf. Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev.
Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974) (California court adopted
the UCC notice requirement, but since buyer failed to provide proper and timely
notice to the builder, he was denied any recovery for latent defects in the building).
Second, the right of action under this implied warranty arose only after delivery of
the deed. See, e.g., Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974) (purchaser
recovered damages for flooded basement after deed passed and possession taken).
Finally, courts found implied warranties only under limited circumstances. One
such circumstance was the failure of a house to protect its inhabitants from the ele-
ments. See, e.g., Utz v. Moss, 31 Colo. App. 475, 503 P.2d 365 (1972) (water damage
caused by rain because of improper grading); Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743
(Ky. 1969) (structural defects caused basement flooding); Weeks v. Slavick Builders,
Inc., 24 Mich. App. 621, 180 N.W.2d 503 (1970) (court found implied warranty that
roof would protect home's inhabitants); Hartley v. Ballou, 286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d
776 (1974) (basement flooding due to inclement weather). Other problems constitut-
ing breach of warranty include structural conditions which render the house danger-
ous, and latent defects in the utilities. For cases dealing with structural damage, see,
e.g., Cochran v. Keeton, 287 Ala. 439, 252 So. 2d 313 (1971) (fire damage); Carpenter
v. Donohoe, 154 Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399 (1964) (structural defects caused cave-in of
walls to such an extent that purchasers had to move out); Wright v. Creative Corp., 30
Colo. App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179 (1972) (failure to install safety glass caused injury to
infant); Vernali v. Centrella, 28 Conn. Supp. 476, 266 A.2d 200 (1970) (use of flam-
mable material to construct fireplace); Centrella v. Holland Constr. Co., 82 Misc. 2d
537, 370 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Suffolk County Dist. Ct. 1975) (oak floors buckled); Humber
v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968) (fire burned house down due to defective
construction); Klos v. Gockel, 87 Wash. 2d 567, 554 P.2d 1349 (1976) (requiring struc-
tural defect which rendered house uninhabitable).
For cases on defective utilities, see, e.g., Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 449
S.W.2d 922 (1970) (liability imposed for defective construction of ductwork with im-
peded heating and air conditioning); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App.
2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (defective construction of heating
system); Elderkin v. Gaster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d 771 (1972) (builder's failure to
provide potable water constituted breach of implied warranty of habitability); Ta-
vares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975) (builder installed defective septic tank
causing raw sewage flow into open trench near house).
27. Under common law analysis, the construction of a home on real property was
merely the creation of an appurtenance. Thus, the emphasis of the courts was on the
realty, not the building. The buyer had only the limited remedy of resorting to sub-
stantial performance for defective construction. See notes 40-45 infra. Modern courts
[Vol. 20:247
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IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
these courts have noted the injustice of treating realty and personalty
differently.29 Refusing to regard house sales solely as sales of land,
they consider the mass-produced house3" a product inviting applica-
tion of the UCC. Courts applying the UCC by analogy3 have em-
ployed the warranty provisions of Article Two,32 noting similarities
have recognized that the purchase of a house is an end in itself. They have noted that
the transactions are two-tiered: a contract to build and a contract to convey property.
Cf. Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal. Rptr. 648
(1974) (California Supreme Court rejected this trend, noting that a house bears the
same relationship to manufacturing as it does to real property).
28. See Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). Schi-
per, an early warranty case involving a completed house, addressed the policy consid-
erations supporting builder liability. Examining the marketing of mass-produced
homes, the court noted that form contracts precluded actual negotiations for warran-
ties. Under the court's analysis, the house purchasers were deemed victims of one-
sided agreements since they were unable to reasonably inspect their new houses. The
court concluded that retaining caveat emptor for real property, when that doctrine was
no longer applicable to goods, was anachronistic and contrary to public policy. Id. at
82, 207 A.2d at 321. Drawing from strict liability cases, such as Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), the court found that the
strict liability theory imposed on manufacturers was also applicable to builders. Id.
at 89-91, 207 A.2d at 324-25. See also Wawak v. Stewart, 247 Ark. 1093, 1095, 449
S.W.2d 922, 923 (1970) ("The contrast between the rules of law applicable to the sale
of personal property and those applicable to the sale of real property [is] so great as to
be indefensible.").
29. See note 28 supra.
30. See Haskell, supra note 15. Mass-produced homes are defined as those built
from builder-supplied plans, O'Dell v. Custom Builders, 560 S.W.2d 862 (Mo. 1978),
or in the builder-vendor's development, Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70,
207 A.2d 314 (1965). Purchasing under such circumstances, the buyer usually is not
in the proper economic position to negotiate for warranties. Presumably, the builder's
hability in a home designed on behalf of, or by the owner would be different; the
purchaser is in a better bargaining position and may negotiate for warranties.
31. See, e.g., Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 12 Cal.3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115
Cal. Rptr. 648 (1974) (applying the UCC to an apartment building); O'Dell v. Custom
Builders, 560 S.W.2d 862 (Mo. 1978) (UCC applied to defective house plans which
resulted in the construction of a dangerous home); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co.,
479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972) (defective installation of floor slabs); Casavant v.
Campopiano, 114 R.I. 24, 327 A.2d 831 (1974) (defective construction of roof);
Bolkum v. Staab, 133 Vt. 467, 346 A.2d 210 (1975) (applied UCC to a commercial
vendor who contracted out to construct homes).
32. UCC § 2-102 provides that the Code does not directly apply to realty. Cf.
Gable v. Silver, 258 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1972) (holding UCC inapplicable because a con-
dominium is not a good within its meaning). See also Gallegos v. Graff, 32 Colo.
App. 213, 508 P.2d 798 (1973). Gallegos examines the Article Two definitional sec-
tion, § 2-105, which distinguishes goods from realty. The court took notice of the
language in the official comments to § 2-304 that "this Article . .. do[es] not affect
1980]
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between a house and a good.33 In each instance, the consumer needs
protection from defective manufacturing.34
the transfer of realty. . . since [it] fall[s] outside the scope of this Article [and] is left
to the courts and other legislation." Id. at 214, 508 P.2d at 799.
Although the UCC precludes its own application, courts have adopted it by anal-
ogy. This application of Article Two to areas other than sales is not unusual. For
example, one commentator dealing with the analogy problem notes that the use of
Article Two is desirable because it provides for uniformity of treatment. Comment,
The Extension ofArticle 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to Leases of Goods, 12
TULSA L.J. 556 (1977). Furthermore, under this rationale, the specific application of
the UCC by analogy to real property does not seem strained. The propriety of the
analogy is especially evident when the UCC is compared with the UNIFORM LAND
TRANSACTION ACT (West 1975) [hereinafter cited as U.L.T.A.]:
UCC § 2-314 IMPLIED WARRANTY; MERCHANTABILITY; USAGE OF TRADE:
1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind ...
2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used ...
U.L.T.A. § 2-309 IMPLIED WARRANTY OF QUALITY:
b) A seller, .. in the business of selling real estate impliedly warrants that
the real estate is suitable for the ordinary uses of real estate of its type and that
any improvement made or contracted for by him will be:
1) free from defective materials; and
2) constructed in accordance with applicable law, according to sound en-
gineering and construction standards ...
While the U.L.T.A. has not been adopted, a brief examination of the statute reveals
that its drafters found the UCC an appropriate model for a real property statute. The
language of the statute reflects the recognition of the similarity of the sale of houses
and goods.
Judicial applications of the UCC to real property reveal at least two clear problems.
First, it is difficult to determine whether the courts have applied all or only part of
Article Two in response to legislative inaction regarding house purchaser protection.
Frequently, where courts announce, as in Pollard, that they are applying the warranty
provisions they do not clarify whether other related provisions also apply. This is
particularly important in regard to § 2-316, which provides for disclaimers. See, e.g.,
Griffin v. Wheeler-Leonard & Co., 290 N.C. 185, 225 S.E.2d 557 (1976) (court ad-
dressed the disclaimer problem, stating that a builder may disclaim if he complies
with UCC notice requirement). Further, the courts have not clearly stated which
UCC warranty provisions they are using. This omission leaves the warranty standard
undefined. See also note 66 infra.
33. See note 31 supra.
34. This erratic development of the implied warranty of habitability has raised
some analytical problems for the courts. The most perplexing problem is whether to
characterize the warranty action as contract or tort. For instance, in Smith v. Old
Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1972), the Missouri Supreme Court, while
[Vol. 20:247
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Illinois appellate decisions exemplify the conflict between the im-
plied warranty of habitability and the older doctrines of caveat
emptor and merger. In 1962, the court in Weck v. A.'M Construction
Co." found an implied warranty of habitability on a new house
purchased from a builder-vendor. The court followed the English
Rule36 because the house was purchased during construction.37 A
year later, however, when the same issue arose in Coutrakon v. Ad-
ams,3s an appellate court of another district rejected Weck, relying
instead upon the principle of caveat emptor. The Illinois Supreme
Court granted leave to appeal Coutrakon on the implied warranty
issue, but avoided that issue by affirming the lower court on other
looking to the UCC, concluded that the implied warranty is a hybrid of contract and
tort. Id. at 798. Thus, this case has been cited frequently both for applying the UCC
and obscuring the nature of the implied warranty of habitability.
If the court classifies a warranty as tort, the doctrine of merger would not be a bar
to recovery. Since merger is concerned solely with contractual obligations, the im-
plied warranty would, in effect, survive delivery of the deed. Furthermore, a court's
classification of warranty under tort theory would circumvent the privity requirement
that is indigenous to contract. See Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d
224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (granting recovery to a purchaser who
had no privity with the builder-vendor). But see Utz v. Moss, 31 Colo. App. 475, 503
P.2d 365 (1972) (the court upheld the privity requirement except where builder-ven-
dor sold to a realtor for resale).
The statute of limitations problem is similar. States have different statutes of limi-
tations for negligence, strict liability, other torts, and contracts. E.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 52-573 to 598 (1979). (§ 52-577 for tort-3 years; § 52-584 for negligence-2
years from date injury sustained is discovered, but no more than 3 years from act or
omission; § 52-577(a) for strict liability-8 years maximum; § 52-576 for contract-6
years). The problem is further complicated by analogies to UCC § 2-725, the statute
of limitations provision, which provides four years. Thus, the classification of war-
ranty as tort or contract creates various analytical complications. See generally Com-
ment, Implied Warranty of Habiabilit -- Contract or Tort, 31 BAYLOR L. REv. 207
(1979).
35. 36 Ill. App. 2d 383, 184 N.E.2d 728 (1st Dist. 1962).
36. Id. at 390, 184 N.E.2d at 731-32. See note 20 and accompanying text supra
for an explanation of the English Rule and its rationale.
37. The Week court had to resolve a hotly contested issue. Even if the defendant
conceded an implied warranty, the builder contended that the house was complete
when purchased. The court found otherwise. Id. at 388, 184 N.E.2d at 729.
Two years later, the same court faced a similar implied warranty case also dealing
with the merger problem. In Brownell v. Quinn, 47 Il. App. 2d 206, 197 N.E.2d 721
(Ist Dist. 1964), the court followed the Week decision. Because some work was per-
formed after delivery of the deed, the court found there was no merger.
38. 39 IU. App. 2d 290, 188 N.E.2d 780 (3rd Dist: 1964), afdon other grounds, 31
Ill. 2d 189, 201 N.E.2d 100 (1964).
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grounds.39 Such action left the status of the warranty uncertain.
Consequently, some purchasers who discovered defects in their new
houses brought suits on a theory of substantial performance40 rather
than implied warranty.41
Under contract law, the doctrine of substantial performance pre-
vents a house buyer from avoiding a building contract when the
builder delivers a house in substantial compliance with the agree-
ment.42 An Illinois builder need not deliver a perfect house to sub-
stantially perform; he must only act in good faith and in a
workmanlike manner.43 Despite acceptance of the theory, however,
the doctrine has met with difficulties in its application. As there is no
formal rule defining what constitutes substantial performance, the
trier of fact faces the difficult problem of determining whether the
39. 31 Ill. 2d 189, 201 N.E.2d 100 (1964). The court avoided the issue of implied
warranty. Instead, it found the evidence was insufficient to support the jury verdict.
Id. at 191-92, 201 N.E.2d at 101.
In Coutrakon, the purchaser sued, alleging that the builder improperly installed a
boiler, resulting in fire damage. Id. at 190, 201 N.E.2d at 101. In absence of affirma-
tive proof of the builder's negligent conduct, the court would not impose liability. Id.
at 191, 201 N.E.2d at 101.
40. See, e.g., Broncata v. Timbercrest Est., Inc., 100 II1. App. 2d 49, 241 N.E.2d
569 (Ist Dist. 1968). Under warranty type facts, the court permitted the purchasers to
recover for deficiencies in construction. .d. at 55, 241 N.E.2d at 572-73. Cf. Ehard v.
Pistakee Builders, Inc., 111 Ill. App. 2d 227, 250 N.E.2d 1 (2d Dist. 1969). The buyer
based this action on implied warranty. The builder constructed the heating system
improperly. The appellate court, criticizing the supreme court for avoiding the war-
ranty issue, decided the case by construing the contract language to provide for the
requested relief, likewise avoiding the warranty issue. Id. at 232-33, 250 N.E.2d at 3-
4.
41. In the five years following Coutrakon, only one suit under the implied war-
ranty theory reached the appellate level. That case, Narup v. Higgins, 51111. App. 2d
102, 200 N.E.2d 922 (5th Dist. 1964) (abstract opinion), followed Coutrakon in deny-
ing the existence of the warranty on the sale of a new home.
42. See Watson Lumber v. Mouser, 30 Ill. App. 3d 100, 333 N.E.2d 19 (5th Dist.
1975). If the owner received substantially what he bargained for, he must pay for it.
The builder must: 1) not willfully depart from the contract, and 2) make a good
faith performance. The buyer's duty to pay arises when the builder-vendor delivers
the house, even if there are technical, unimportant defects. Id. at 105, 333 N.E.2d at
24. Cf. Brewer v. Custom Builders Corp., 42 Ill. App. 3d 668, 356 N.E.2d 565 (5th
Dist. 1976) (substantial performance requires enjoyment of benefits by the buyer).
See generally 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 700-12 (1960); S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 842 (3rd ed. 1962). See also Nordin Constr. Co. v.
City of Nome, 489 P.2d 455 (Alaska 1971) (action to recover damage for alleged fail-
ure of substantial performance); Collyer, Building Contracts and Substantial Perform-
ance in New York, 18 INTRA. L. REv. OF N.Y.U. 103 (1963).
43. See note 40 supra.
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builder has met this standard." Further, the need for an implied
warranty of habitability arose to protect buyers after they had ac-
cepted their houses because the substantial performance doctrine was
inapplicable after acceptance.
Illinois law first acknowledged an implied warranty of habitability
in real property in 1922. In that year, the Illinois Supreme Court
found an implied warranty of habitability on apartments, basing its
decision on consumer protection grounds.45 All but one of the appel-
late districts that have since confronted the implied warranty issue on
new houses have recognized that such a warranty exists.46 Prior to
Petersen, however, they failed to articulate the substance and limits
of the warranty.47
44. Brewer v. Custom Builders Corp., 42 Ill. App. 3d 668, 673, 356 N.E.2d 565,
570 (5th Dist. 1976). See Butkovich & Sons, Inc. v. State Bank of St. Charles, 62 Il1.
App. 3d 810, 379 N.E.2d 837 (2d Dist. 1978) (suit to foreclose mechanic's lien); Wat-
son Lumber Co. v. Guennewig, 79 Ill. App. 2d 377, 226 N.E.2d 270 (5th Dist. 1967)
(action by contractor for unpaid balance due); Dittmer v. Nokleberg, 219 N.W.2d 201
(N.D. 1974) (action to recover damages from contractor for breach of contract). See
also Comment, Substantial Pelyormance: 4 Legal Breach of Duty, 9 LINCOLN L. REV.
275 (1974-75).
Where the jury finds substantial performance, the builder is entitled to receive the
contract price less damages for deficiencies. If the jury finds inadequate performance,
under certain circumstances the buyer may rescind. See generally 3 A. CORBIN, CON-
TRACTS §§ 707-12 (1960). See also D. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 12.14 (1973).
Courts have distinguished cases involving construction on the builder's property
from those involving property of the buyer. In the former case, as in Petersen, courts
are likely to grant rescission. The builder has not lost his labor and materials. In the
latter case, granting rescission would often operate as a hardship on the builder and
unjustly enrich the property owner. This situation is more difficult, and the result
turns on the specific facts. See S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS § 842, p. 167 n.4 (3d ed. 1962); D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.23 (1973).
See also Collyer, supra note 42.
45. Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 II. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 200 (1972).
46. After Narup v. Higgins, 51 111. App. 2d 102, 200 N.E.2d 922 (5th Dist. 1964)
(discussed in note 41 supra), every Illinois court that addressed the implied warranty
issue found such a warranty. Even the third district, which decided Coutrakon, found
an implied warranty of habitability in Hanavan v. Dye, 4 Ill. App. 2d 576, 281 N.E.2d
398 (1972). Yet the Hanayan court refused to overrule Coutrakon. In a rather re-
markable piece of legal thinking, the court distinguished the earlier case on geograph-
ical grounds. Since Coutrakon, there was a redistricting of appellate courts. As a
result, the Hana'an property, formerly in another district, was not subject to the ear-
lier decision. See also Conyers v. Molloy, 50 11. App. 3d 17, 364 N.E.2d 986 (4th
Dist. 1977); Goggin v. Fox Valley Constr. Co., 48 Ill. App. 3d 103, 365 N.E.2d 509 (1st
Dist. 1977); Elmore v. Blume, 31 Ill. App. 3d 643, 304 N.E.2d 431 (3rd Dist. 1975);
Garcia v. Hynes & Howe Real Estate, Inc., 29 Ill. App. 3d 479 (3d Dist. 1975).
47. See, e.g., note 12 supra.
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In Petersen v. Hubschman Construction Co., the Illinois Supreme
Court faced the dual issues of implied warranty of habitability and
substantial performance. The court, following the modem trend, ex-
plicitly found an implied warranty in the sale of new houses to indi-
vidual purchasers, irrespective of the extent of completion. 8 Noting
that the lower courts had difficulties in defining this warranty, 49 the
court resolved the definitional problem by adopting the warranty lan-
guage of the UCC.5 ° The court recognized implicitly the UCC's ef-
fectiveness in the law of sales and therefore felt its application to
mass-produced houses would also be advantageous.
Once defined, the Petersen court uniquely applied the implied war-
ranty. Other courts had traditionally found an implied warranty of
habitability cause of action only when defects appeared following
completion of the house and passing of title.5 ' Under the Petersen
analysis, however, the implied warranty is not simply a curative
cause of action, but also serves as a condition precedent of an execu-
tory contract.5 2 To prove substantial performance, a builder-vendor
must prove he has fulfilled the requirements of the implied warranty.
The Petersen court's combination of substantial performance and
the implied warranty of habitability creates a significant innovation
in building contract law.53 In previous substantial performance suits,
courts were unable to clearly articulate a standard of performance;
decisions turned solely on the facts of each case. 4 By making the
implied warranty an element of substantial performance, the Illinois
Supreme Court has delineated a workable standard of proof for sub-
stantial performance. If the builder-vendor complies with the war-
48. 76 1. 2d 31,42, 389 N.E.2d 1154, 1159 (1979). See notes 23-25 and accompa-
nying text supra.
49. The court held that the implied warranty was limited to latent defects which
would interfere with its intended use. The court would not apply the warranty for
cosmetic defects. 76 IM. 2d at 42, 389 N.E.2d at 1159. See note 12 supra.
50. The court referred to UCC § 2-314 and 2-315, but its use of the UCC analog,
"a warranty that the house. . . would be reasonably suited for its intended use,"
could be construed to make either section applicable. 76 I11. 2d at 41-42, 389 N.E.2d
at 1158-59. But see note 55 infra, for a criticism of the court's lack of clarity.
51. Seenote 26supra.
52. 76 I11. 2d at 42, 389 N.E.2d at 1159.
53. No other decision recognizes the implied warranty of habitability before the
transfer of title. The Petersen case thus ties together the law of implied warranty and
substantial performance, making equivalent defects discovered before and after trans-
fer of title.
54. See. notes 42-44 and accompanying text supra.
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ranty provisions of Article Two, there is substantial performance and
the buyer cannot rescind." The court, in effect, has established
guidelines to govern the builder's conduct.
The Petersen decision logically and justifiably extends the implied
warranty of habitability to the doctrine of substantial performance.
By using the UCC the court objectified a standard once considered
problematic. 6 Petersen realistically reflects the similarity between
mass-produced houses and goods, ignoring irrelevant, technical dis-
tinctions. 7 The opinion, however, neglects to identify the applicable
UCC warranty provision. This omission may cause problems in
the harder cases because the standards of the relevant provisions dif-
fer.5 9 Nevertheless, the use of any UCC standard to define warranty
55. 76 Ill.2d at 43, 389 N.E.2d at 1160. The court noted the limit of its decision.
The Petersens agreed to purchase a home built on Hubschman's land. The court
expressly declined to decide whether the same remedy would apply on land provided
by the purchaser. In light of the broad implications of the decision, the court's refusal
to resolve the problem suggests that it might decide against the purchaser in that
instance. Yet, such a conclusion may undermine the essence of the decision. A house
built on the buyer's land is no easier to inspect than one built on land of the seller.
The sole justification for the court's choice of remedy may be the prevention of unjust
enrichment. Thus, where a builder constructs on the buyer's land and fails to sub-
stantially perform, the court might provide only damages. See notes 42-44 and ac-
companying text supra.
56. See notes 42-44 and accompanying text supra.
57. 76 Ill.2d at 40-41, 389 N.E.2d at 1157-58.
58. See note 50 supra.
59. The relevant provisions are as follows:
§ 2-314. IMPLIED WARRANTY; MERCHANTABILITY; USAGE OF TRADE
1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a
merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for
value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a
sale.
2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
c) are fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used; and
d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement
may require; and
f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container
or label if any.
§ 2-315. IMPLIED WARRANTY; FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSE
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
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and substantial performance will clarify the rights and liabilities of
both builders-vendors and purchasers."
The Petersen court advanced the trend of affording greater con-
sumer protection for the new house purchaser. In finding a warranty
of habitability, and using it as an element of substantial performance,
the court extended the protection provided the purchaser both before
and after delivery of the deed. The court, moreover, by merging the
two theories and looking to the UCC, clarified the responsibilities of
the concerned parties. For other jurisdictions, Petersen is an example
of a case whereby future litigants, both builders and buyers, will ben-
efit.
Mark Fogel
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is, unless ex-
cluded or modified under the next section, an implied warranty that the goods
shall be fit for such purpose.
The § 2-314 provision prescribes an objective test. If, for example, a house
would "pass in trade," a court might reject a claim of warranty. Under § 2-315,
however, a litigant must prove reliance or lack thereof. If the § 2-315 require-
ment applies, the builder would have an added defense if the purchaser is knowl-
edgeable or in the trade. Thus, if the buyer was knowledgeable regarding the
building trade, a court might have a difficult time determining which standard to
apply. The standard selected is crucial in determining substantial performance.
60. Petersen was followed in Posner v. Davis, 76 Ill. App. 3d 638, 395 N.E.2d 133
(1979).
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